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BUZZKILL: USE OF PRODUCT 
LIABILITY DOCTRINES IN LITIGATION 
AGAINST ENERGY DRINK 
MANUFACTURERS 
Jeremy Kogan∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
ot too long ago, people scoffed at the idea that playing tackle 
football bore some relation to head trauma. Before then, 
people were equally dismissive of the unhealthy consequences of 
tobacco in cigarettes. With each new generation comes new 
knowledge, new research, and ultimately new conclusions about 
the adverse health consequences of actions or items previously 
considered above concern. We must continue to ask ourselves, 
“What products, in use today, adversely affect us in ways yet un-
known?” This paper poses the theory that energy drinks represent 
the answer to that question. Even more important than the an-
swer itself is how will our society—specifically our legal system—
adapt to such revelations? 
Beverage consumers today buy more energy drinks and 
energy shots such as Monster, Red Bull, 5 Hour Energy and NOS 
than ever before.1 The manufacturers typically market the drinks 
to teenagers and young adults while emphasizing the consumer’s 
ability to focus and maintain high levels of energy throughout the 
day.2 These companies primarily appeal to teenagers’ thirst for 
adventure and risk-taking.3 Many studies and experts conclude 
                                                          
   ∗  J.D. Candidate, May 2015, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. 
 1  Michele Simon & James Mosher, Alcohol, Energy Drinks, and Youth: A 
Dangerous Mix, Marin Institute 1, 3 (2007), 
http://www.odmhsas.org/resourcecenter/(S(qtb4qlzedjc32v45lbt2cw55))/Resou
rceCenter/Publications/Current/330.pdf. 
 2  Id. at 4. 
 3  Monster Energy Drinks, 
http://www.monsterenergy.com/us/en/home/#!/pages%3Aabout (last visited 
Feb. 14, 2014) (poking at the mundaneness of 9-5 jobs, playing on children’s 
N 
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that these drinks contain seriously unsafe ingredients that can 
cause rapid heart rates, increased blood pressure, and a host of 
side effects including neurological symptoms.4 Yet, because some 
of these manufacturers characterize their products as “dietary 
supplements” instead of a conventional food (or drink), they es-
cape some of the more onerous regulations the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) imposes under the Federal Food, Drug 
and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA).5 The FDA does not require active 
ingredients in dietary supplements to be pre-approved before 
production; therefore, the FDA shoulders the burden to prove the 
product unsafe before taking it off the market.6 Interestingly, the 
FDA classifies food products as either dietary supplements or 
conventional foods, not based on their ingredients, but, rather 
how the manufacturer decides to market the product.7 Thus, as 
long as the energy drink manufacturer continues to market its 
drink as a dietary supplement, the manufacturer will skirt the 
more burdensome regulations usually required of conventional 
drinks.8 
Congress could amend the FFDCA to provide for energy 
drinks as conventional drinks, rather than dietary supplements. 
However, a number of factors make this prospect unlikely. First, 
as scrutiny over energy drinks increases, so too will the money 
“Big Energy Drink” spends on lobbyists to maintain the status 
                                                                                                                                       
dreams of becoming athletes, musicians and “living the life”, referring to this 
demographic as the “new generation”); Monster Energy Drinks, 
http://www.monsterenergy.com/us/en/athletes/ (last visited Jan.) (list of nearly 
230 extreme sports athletes who are sponsored by Monster alone); see Simon, 
supra note 1 (use of product names). 
 4  Lawyers and Settlements, Monster Energy Drinks Plaintiff Attorney 
Weighs In, (May 28, 2013, 4:30 PM), 
http://www.lawyersandsettlements.com/articles/monster-energy-drink-deaths-
hospitalizations/interview-monster-energy-drink-deaths-
18756.html?utm_expid=3607522-
2&utm_referrer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.lawyersandsettlements.com%2Fsear
ch.html%3Fkeywords%3Denergy%2Bdrinks#.Uo_Sx5TwL0i (American 
Academy of pediatrics and American Heart Association have warned heavily 
about the dangers of energy drinks); Lawyers and Settlements, Energy Drink 
Side Effects, http://www.lawyersandsettlements.com/lawsuit/energy-drink-
heart-attack.html#.Uo_LZpTwL0h (last updated Oct. 30, 2013) (side effects of 
energy drinks). 
 5  Peter B. Hutt, FDA Statutory Authority to Regulate the Safety of Die-
tary Supplements, 31 Am. J.L. & Med. 155, 156 (2005). 
 6  Lawyers and Settlements, supra note 4. 
 7  21 U.S.C. § 321(ff); See Hutt, supra note 5. 
 8   Hutt, supra note 5. 
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quo.9 The government would likely require the FDA to launch a 
lengthy and detailed investigation into the effect of energy drinks 
on consumer health,10 always with the possibility that its findings 
may be “inconclusive”. Further, the difficulties of recent Congres-
sional gridlock make an amendment to the law unlikely.  Finally, 
the efficient and profit-driven energy drink companies will al-
ways attempt to stay one step ahead of FDA regulations. 
Without more stringent FDA oversight or a Congressional 
amendment to the FFDCA, who can hold these energy drink 
manufacturers accountable? The answer lies with the judicial 
system.  This very new area of product liability law will expand 
as courts continue to refine the law in this area. American courts 
have not yet held energy drink manufacturers liable to individu-
als who are injured using their products. Individuals have filed a 
handful of lawsuits, mostly within the last six months, using pre-
dominantly product liability theories in an attempt to hold manu-
facturers liable.11 However, no resolution has yet occurred. 
This article examines which specific theories of product li-
ability give plaintiffs the best case against energy drink compa-
nies, in addition to a number of the more pressing questions that 
plaintiffs will encounter. Specifically, should plaintiffs bring suit 
under strict liability doctrines or negligence doctrines? Alterna-
tively, should plaintiffs allege defective design, defective manu-
facture or failure to warn? 
This paper provides an overview of the regulatory scheme 
currently governing energy drinks and what the judiciary can do 
to hold these manufacturers accountable moving forward. Part I 
explores the FDA’s regulatory authority over energy drinks, 
which is at best, ineffective, and at worst, backwards. Part II 
looks specifically at pending lawsuits against energy drink com-
                                                          
 9  Catherine Ho, Monster Energy, Red Bull turn to lobbyists for help, 
Washington Post (Jan. 28, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-01-
28/business/36585615_1_energy-drinks-monster-energy-5-hour-energy. 
 10  Investigations Operations Manual 366, 376-77. 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ICECI/Inspections/IOM/UCM123515.pdf (last 
updated Sept. 5, 2013). 
 11  Adler v. Innovation Ventures, LLC, No. 2:13-CV-01256, 2013 WL 
1088915 (D.N.J. filed Mar. 1, 2013); Zuckman v. Monster Beverage Corp., No. 
12-1978 JDB, 2013 WL 3992932 (D.D.C. Aug. 6, 2013) (order granting motion 
to remand); People v. Monster Beverage Corp., No. CGC-13-531161, 2013 WL 
1874733 (Cal. Super. filed May 6, 2013); Carroll v. Vital Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 
No. 3:13-CV-00088, 2013 WL 2390473 (N.D.G.A. May 23, 2013) (notice of re-
moval); Crossland v. Monster Beverage Corp., No. RIC 1215551, 2012 WL 
5007518 (Cal. Super. filed Oct. 17, 2012); Morris v. Monster Beverage Corp., 
No. RG 13685028, 2013 WL 3197674 (Cal. Super. filed June 25, 2013). 
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panies and explores the plaintiffs’ various theories of liability. 
Part III examines how various product liability doctrines apply in 
the context of litigation against energy drink manufacturers. Part 
III additionally analyzes which avenue of product liability law 
most likely leads to plaintiff recovery as well as several of the 
possible, but significant, troubles a plaintiff may run into in liti-
gation against energy drink companies. 
II.  FDA REGULATION OF ENERGY DRINKS 
A.  Background 
Federal regulation of food and drinks began in 1906 when 
Congress passed the Pure Food and Drug Act (PFDA) in 1906.12 
The PFDA was the beginning of federal regulation of the food 
and beverage industry.13 The PFDA imposed liability on a person 
or company who adulterated or misbranded any food item.14 Alt-
hough the law provided for removal of any adulterated or mis-
branded food, the law failed to impose liability on those who 
made false claims regarding the food’s effectiveness.15 Congress 
amended the law in 1912, but the PFDA became moot once Con-
gress passed the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) 
in 1938, which provided for the official creation of the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA).16 
The FDA’s authority to regulate food products continued 
to grow through a 1962 amendment to the FDCA,17 the Medical 
Devices Act (MDA) of 1970,18 and the Dietary Supplement 
                                                          
 12  Federal Food and Drug Act of 1906 (Pure Food and Drug Act), Pub. L. 
No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) (repealed by 21 U.S.C. § 329(a)). 
 13  Id. 
 14  Id. 
 15  Deborah F. Buckman, Remedies Available for Violations of Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 25 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 431 (2008) (provid-
ing a general overview of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act). In 1911, 
in United States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488, 498 (1911), the Supreme Court held 
that although the Pure Food Act prohibited mislabeling of drug ingredients, it 
did not forbid other kinds of fraudulent claims made on product labels. 
 16  Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 
1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 321 (2006)). 
 17  Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 101, 76 Stat. 780, 780-
96 (1962) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 351 (2006)) (generally requiring 
manufacturers of drugs demonstrate their products are safe and effective with 
“substantial evidence”). 
 18  Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 
(1976) (requiring heightened government oversight for the safety and effective-
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Health and Education Act of 1994 (DSHEA).19 Read together, 
these acts and statutes give the FDA the difficult and burden-
some duty of ensuring that food, drug, and cosmetic products are 
of high integrity so that consumers can trust product safety with-
out question.20 
The DSHEA also created a subcategory of products that 
are not necessarily regulated by the FDA, but rather by the Cen-
ter for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition (CFSAN).21 CFSAN 
sets its own statutory requirements for dietary supplement classi-
fication, and imposes its own regulatory requirements on dietary 
supplement manufacturers.22 Therefore, a manufacturer can 
choose which regulatory scheme to follow, by classifying its 
product as a dietary supplement or a conventional food product. 
B.  Regulatory Requirements of Conventional Beverages and 
Dietary Supplements 
The DSHEA permits dietary supplement manufacturers 
to market its product without receiving any pre-market authori-
zation by the FDA.23 The DSHEA grandfathers into its regulato-
ry scheme any products marketed as dietary supplements before 
the enactment of the DSHEA in 1994.24 On its face, the DSHEA 
seems to require dietary supplement manufacturers to list the 
product’s nutritional facts and ingredients, including caffeine, as 
well their amounts, on the product label.25 However, DSHEA 
permits the manufacturer to avoid listing the specific content of 
                                                                                                                                       
ness of medical devices intended for human use). 
 19  Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act (DSHEA), Pub. L. No. 
103-417, 108 Stat. 4325 (1994) (providing statutory requirements for a product 
to be classified as a dietary supplement. The DSHEA imposes additional regu-
latory requirements for those products so classified). 
 20  Joseph G. Hoflander, A Red Bull Instead of A Cigarette: Should the 
FDA Regulate Energy Drinks?, 45 Val. U. L. Rev. 689, 696 (2011). 
 21  DSHEA, supra note 17; See About the Center for Food Safety and Ap-
plied Nutrition, FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/centersoffices/officeoffoods/cfsan/default.htm 
(last updated November 25, 2013) (providing general information about the 
CFSAN). 
 22   21 U.S.C. § 321(ff)(1) (2006) (defines a “dietary supplement” as “a prod-
uct (other than tobacco) intended to supplement the diet that bears or contains 
one or more of” several exclusively listed ingredients). 
 23  See Barbara A. Noah, Foreword: Dietary Supplement Regulation in 
Flux, 31 Am. J.L. & Med. 147, 148 (2005)(explaining Congress’s intention in 
drafting the DSHEA). 
 24  Id. 
 25 DSHEA, supra note 17. 
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the blended amounts on its labels, if the manufacturer claims that 
it uses its ingredients in a proprietary blend. 26 As a result, a con-
sumer who compares the labels of energy drinks to Diet Coke, for 
example, is told that both drinks contain caffeine, but not told 
that one contains significantly more of the ingredient than the 
other. 
From these DSHEA provisions, it may be inferred that di-
etary supplements could possibly contain unsafe ingredients, as 
long as the ingredients were used in supplements before the en-
actment of the 1994 law.27 However, the FDA mandates most di-
etary supplement manufacturers to report any adverse side effects 
of their products to the FDA in an adverse event report (AER).28 
However, how the FDA handles AERs from dietary supplement 
manufacturers remains unclear. Further, many AERs do not con-
tain sufficient information to allow the FDA to properly evaluate 
the claim.29 It is also worth noting that between the years 2008 
and the second quarter of 2012, the FDA received an excess of 
three million AERs from consumers, healthcare professionals, at-
torneys, and industry-specific mandated reporters, including the 
dietary supplements industry.30 
The regulatory environment of conventional food and 
beverages, on the other hand, tells another story. Since conven-
tional beverages do not qualify as over-the-counter drugs or die-
tary supplements, conventional beverage manufacturers do not 
have to file an AER with the FDA, even if the manufacturer is 
aware that the product produces adverse consequences.31 Bever-
age manufacturers must receive pre-market authorization by the 
FDA, thereby ensuring that it contains only safe ingredients.32 Al-
so, in contrast to FDA regulations for dietary supplements, con-
ventional beverages must disclose the amount of its ingredients, 
including, in some cases, caffeine, on the label.33 However, a re-
                                                          
 26  Id. 
 27  Id.; See Lawyers and Settlements, supra note 4. 
 28  21 U.S.C. § 379aa-1(b). 
 29  FDA Adverse Event Reporting System, FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Surve
illance/AdverseDrugEffects/default.htm (last updated September 10, 2012). 
 30  FDA Adverse Drug Experience Reporting, 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandT
obacco/CDER/ucm082056.htm (last updated January 22, 2010). 
 31  Id. 
 32   21 U.S.C.A. § 348 (West 2013). 
 33   21 U.S.C.A. § 343 (West 2013) (the listing of dietary ingredients shall 
include the quantity of each such ingredient per serving). 
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cent study by Consumer Reports found that of sixteen energy 
drinks that conspicuously include caffeine content on their labels, 
at least five labels significantly understate the actual amount of 
caffeine present in the drink.34 Some of these understatements oc-
cur in energy drinks containing guarine, which in itself contains 
concentrated amounts of caffeine, and the manufacturers over-
look the caffeine present in such ingredients when calculating the 
caffeine content in the drink.35 
In sum, a tradeoff exists between the FDA regulating 
products as a dietary supplement or a conventional food and bev-
erage. Dietary supplement manufacturers, in general, do not need 
to disclose the full blend of ingredients on their labels, and may 
use ingredients that the FDA would not otherwise recognize as 
generally safe. The FDA does, however, mandate adverse event 
reporting by dietary supplement manufacturers for any known 
adverse side effects of the product. The FDA does not require 
conventional food and beverage manufacturers to report adverse 
side effects to the FDA, but they may only use ingredients that 
are generally recognized as safe, and they must list their ingredi-
ents on the label.36 The FDA has been traditionally lax in regulat-
ing the caffeine content of energy drinks—at least those classified 
as conventional beverages—and the agency does not require 
warning labels or the amount of caffeine in the product the way 
that it does for over-the-counter caffeine-containing stimulants.37 
There is nothing inherently shocking about the regulatory 
differences between conventional foods and dietary supplements. 
Curiously, however, the FDA does not classify products based on 
its ingredients, but, rather how the manufacturer markets its 
product.38 Therefore, manufacturers can essentially choose which 
                                                          
 34  The Buzz on Energy Drink Caffeine, CONSUMER REPORTS (Dec. 
2012), http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/magazine/2012/12/the-buzz-on-
energy-drink-caffeine/index.htm. 
 35  Energy Drink Ingredients and What They Do, Caffeine Informer, 
http://www.energyfiend.com/energy-drink-ingredients (last updated Dec. 5, 
2013); Laura Johannes, Can a Caffeine-Packed Plant Give a Boost? The Wall 
Street Journal, March 2, 2010, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405274870429980457509558173
5183488. 
 36  See DSHEA, supra note 17. 
 37   Reissig, C.J., et al., Caffeinated Energy Drinks—A Growing Problem. 
Drug Alcohol Depend (2009), 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2735818/. 
 38  See 21 U.S.C. § 321(ff) (2006); Peter Barton Hutt, FDA Statutory Au-
thority to Regulate the Safety of Dietary Supplements, 31 Am. J.L. & Med. 155, 
156 (2005). 
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regulatory scheme they wish to comply with (food and beverage 
or dietary supplement) simply by altering marketing strategies. 
The inconsistencies that result in this sort of scheme are readily 
apparent. For example, energy drinks like Red Bull, Monster and 
Amp classify themselves as conventional beverages while Rock-
star classifies itself as a dietary supplement,39 despite the obvious 
similarity of the products and their respective ingredients. Fur-
ther complicating the matter, energy drink manufacturers can 
switch back and forth between dietary supplement and a conven-
tional food classification as a means to suit business needs. In-
deed, in 2013 Monster took advantage of this procedural loophole 
by switching from a dietary supplement classification to a con-
ventional beverage classification.40 
C.  Summary 
By definition, a regulation is a mandatory compliance re-
quirement that an administrative body imposes on any entity 
properly within the regulation’s scope. That is, if regulations ap-
ply, the administrative body should not allow a company to skirt 
those regulations simply because they might harm corporate prof-
its. While the regulatory system surrounding energy drinks is 
more compulsory than a self-regulation system, the present sys-
tem is essentially one of self-classification. Energy drink manu-
facturers may not escape regulation entirely, but they can choose 
which set of regulations to comply with—a concept wholly oppo-
site to mandatory regulation. In this light, FDA oversight is not 
so much a strong hand designed to ensure safety in consumer 
food products, but is rather just one of a myriad of factors that 
energy drink companies will consider when trying to boost their 
bottom line.41 
Without new legislation or changes to the FDCA or the 
                                                          
 39  Lawyers and Settlements, supra note 4. 
 40  Jacques Wilson, Monster Energy adds caffeine content to labels 
(3/21/2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/21/health/monster-energy-
beverages/index.html?hpt=hp_bn13 (while the switch would require Monster 
to list its ingredients on its label, Monster no longer has to report adverse side 
effects of its products to the FDA. The negative media coverage surrounding 
Monster and some of the hospitalizations some have claimed as a result of 
drinking Monster is a likely motive for the switch from dietary supplement to 
conventional beverage). 
 41  It is not the profit-driven nature of the energy drink companies that 
should draw scrutiny here, but rather the FDA which allows the regulatory 
environment to be so egregiously taken advantage of, that should draw the ire 
of criticism. 
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DSHEA, energy drink companies will continue to operate under 
the regime of self-classification. FDA regulations, drafted to pro-
tect consumers, end up in a pliable regulatory system and the 
regulations lose their protective purpose. If the regulatory arm 
(and by extension the legislature as well) of the government can-
not hold energy drink manufacturers accountable for the harms 
their products cause, the question becomes who will assume that 
role? 
III.  CURRENT ENERGY DRINK LITIGATION 
While the congress and the FDA struggle to find a more 
comprehensive way to regulate energy drink manufacturers, the 
judicial system has the ability to hold these companies civilly lia-
ble for any harm they may cause. Judicial “regulation”42 is com-
pensatory in nature; meaning injured consumers benefit from 
court decisions. Furthermore, litigation, or the threat of litigation, 
has the ability deter energy drink companies who use inadequate 
warning labels or grossly excessive amounts of caffeine or other 
unsafe ingredients in their products. 
Individuals have filed several lawsuits against energy 
drink manufacturers in the last six months, and that number will 
grow as more research, on the effects of energy drinks on the hu-
man body, is conducted and becomes available.43 Currently, most 
claims fall into one of two categories: class actions or personal in-
jury claims.44 
Class action lawsuits have taken aim at the misleading 
advertising claims energy drink companies make, and/or viola-
tion of other general consumer protection laws.45 For example, 
the plaintiff’s allegations in Adler v. Innovation Ventures stem 
                                                          
 42  The term “judicial regulation” here is not intended to convey support 
for a form of judicial activism, but is intended as a description for how con-
sumers can hold energy drink companies accountable through effective use of 
the judiciary. 
 43  Ho, supra note 9. 
 44  An even more creative category separate from the following two in-
volves a claim that Monster’s classification as a dietary supplement is itself a 
violation of state consumer protection laws. Although this is probably the most 
creative argument against an energy drink manufacturer, the claim will more 
than likely run into preemption concerns as it is possible that federal FDA reg-
ulations would preempt any state consumer protection statutes. See California 
ex. rel. Herrera v. Monster, No. CGC-13-531161 (Cal. Superior, filed 5/6/2013). 
 45  Adler v. Innovation Ventures, LLC, No. 2:13CV01256 (D.N.J. filed 
3/01/2013); Zuckman v. Monster, No. 2012-CA-008653-B (D.C. Super. Ct. filed 
11/13/2012). 
Kogan2.docx (Do Not Delete)  3/16/2014  1:39 PM 
2014 Litigation Against Energy Drink Manufacturers 325 
from 5-Hour Energy’s misleading claims that the product pro-
vides “hours of energy now” and “no crash later”.46 The plaintiff, 
on behalf of the members of his class, pointed out that despite 5-
Hour Energy’s claim of “no crash later” (indeed, the company 
advertised it as the product’s primary benefit),47 microscopic lan-
guage on both the bottle, which is itself extremely small, and its 
website, pointed out that “no crash” actually means “no sugar 
crash.”48 Since the product itself contained no sugar, 5-Hour En-
ergy’s claims merely stated the obvious—that users will not expe-
rience a sugar-crash because they have not consumed any sug-
ar—but the company failed to disclose that the product did 
indeed cause a caffeine crash.49 The plaintiff in Adler alleged that 
since 2007, 5-Hour Energy knew that about 25% of its users suf-
fered a caffeine crash.50 As a result, the plaintiff sought to hold 5-
Hour Energy liable for untruthful or deceptive advertising claims 
in violation of the New Jersey Fraud in Sales or Advertising of 
Merchandise Law.51 The plaintiff also sought to hold the defend-
ant liable for breach of express warranty,52 breach of implied 
warranty of merchantability,53 and unjust enrichment.54 These 
contract claims stemmed from the same factual allegations that 
the New Jersey Fraud in Sale claim and demonstrated that in ad-
dition to product liability claims (which plaintiff does not make 
here), plaintiffs may succeed on both contract theories of liability 
and violation of state consumer protection statutes. 
While some plaintiffs like Mr. Adler pursued class action 
claims stemming from false or deceptive advertising, the majority 
of plaintiffs, however, allege some sort of direct personal injury 
from the use of the product.55 Research on the effects of energy 
drinks on the human body now show a correlation between ener-
gy drinks and cardiovascular problems including high blood 
                                                          
 46  Pl.’s compl. at 4, Adler v. Innovation Ventures, LLC, No. 2:13CV01256 
(D.N.J. filed 3/01/2013). 
 47  See e.g. http://www.5hourenergy.com/commercials.asp. 
 48  See http://www.5hourenergy.com/index.asp; Adler, supra note 43. 
 49  See http://www.5hourenergy.com/index.asp; Adler, supra note 43. 
 50  Adler, supra note 43. 
 51  Pl.’s compl. at 9, Adler v. Innovation Ventures, LLC, No. 2:13CV01256 
(D.N.J. filed 3/01/2013). 
 52  Id. at 10. 
 53  Id. 
 54  Id. at 11-12. 
 55  See e.g. Carrol v. Vital Pharmaceuticals, No. 3:13CV00088 (N.D.G.A. 
filed 5/23/2013); Crossland v. Monster, No. RIC1215551 (Cal. Superior, filed 
10/17/2012); Morris v. Monster, No. RG13685028 (Cal. Superior, filed 
6/25/2013). 
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pressure, heart palpitations, cardiac arrest, and, in some cases, 
even death.56 Over 39,000 energy drink-related emergency de-
partment visits were recorded between the years 2007 and 2009.57 
Germany, for example, tracked energy drink-specific-related in-
cidents of children, adolescents and young adults since 2002. Re-
ported adverse outcomes included liver damage, kidney failure, 
respiratory disorder and tachycardia, among many others.58 Con-
sumers who combine energy drinks with alcohol or other drugs 
often experience even more drastic and pronounced side effects.59 
The respective deaths of Anais Fournier,60 a fourteen-
year-old female, and Alex Morris,61 a nineteen-year-old male 
spurred two of the most visible product liability personal injury 
lawsuits against energy drink manufacturers. Mr. Morris began 
drinking Monster energy drinks when he was a teenager, and by 
the time he was sixteen years old, he was drinking at least two 
sixteen-ounce cans, and occasionally up to four per day.62 Mr. 
Morris suffered a cardiac arrest in July, 2012, and the cause of 
death was later determined to be cardiac arrhythmia and cardio-
myopathy.63 Anais Fournais, 14, suffered a similar fate when she 
too suffered a heart attack after drinking two 16-ounce cans of 
Monster in the preceding 24-hour period.64 Ms. Fournais’s autop-
sy report concluded cardiac arrhythmia as her cause of death due 
to caffeine toxicity.65 
The Fournais and Morris lawsuits each allege strict liabil-
ity for design defect and failure to warn; negligent design, sale 
and manufacture; negligent failure to warn; fraudulent conceal-
ment; breach of implied warranties; and wrongful death.66 The 
                                                          
 56  Seifert, et. al., Health Effects of Energy Drinks on Children, Adoles-
cents, and Young Adults, Pediatrics (March, 2011), 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3065144/ (hereinafter “Pediat-
rics”). 
   57  Id. 
 58  Id. 
 59  Emergency Department Visits Involving Energy Drinks, The DAWN 
Report (Nov. 22, 2011) (hereinafter “DAWN Report”), 
http://www.samhsa.gov/data/2k11/web_dawn_089/web_dawn_089_html.pdf. 
 60  Crossland v. Monster, No. RIC1215551 (Cal. Super., filed 10/17/2012). 
 61  Morris v. Monster, No. RG13685028 (Cal. Super., filed 6/25/2013). 
 62  Pl.’s Compl. at 3, Morris v. Monster, No. RG13685028 (Cal. Super., 
filed 6/25/2013). 
 63  Id. 
 64  Id. at 2. 
 65  Id. 
 66  Id. at 1; Pl.’s Compl. at 1, Crossland v. Monster,  No. RIC1215551 (Cal. 
Super., filed 10/17/2012). 
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plaintiffs allege that Monster knew of the significant risks associ-
ated with consumption of its product, and that further, Monster 
masked or otherwise failed to warn customers, particularly teen-
agers, of the potentially significant risks associated with the 
product.67 The complaints set out a number of medical findings 
regarding energy drink consumption, especially consumption by 
teenagers and adolescents. The complaints specifically include 
brief synopses of reports68 detailing the adverse health conse-
quences of caffeine,69 teenagers’ vulnerability to caffeine toxici-
ty,70 appropriate daily caffeine limits,71 and Monster’s marketing 
strategy of targeting teenage consumers.72 The plaintiffs have 
seemingly set the stage for a “battle of the experts” to demonstrate 
whether or not Monster’s products were unreasonably dangerous 
and defective when they left Monster’s control.73 The failure to 
warn claim has a similar logic to it, but instead alleges a product 
defect because Monster failed to warn or instruct of the potential 
risks and side effects associated with the drink.74 The more broad 
negligent design, manufacture and sale claim similarly alleges 
that Monster did not exercise reasonable care in, inter alia, the 
design, formulation, testing, manufacture, labeling, marketing 
and/or distribution of Monster energy drinks.75 
Fournais filed the complaint on October 17, 2012, and 
Morris filed the complaint on June 25, 2013, both in the Alameda 
                                                          
 67  Pl.’s Compl. at 5, Crossland v. Monster, No. RIC1215551 (Cal. Super., 
filed 10/17/2012). 
 68   Id. at 3-6. 
 69  Id. at 3; Committee on Nutrition and the Council on Sports Medicine 
and Fitness, Sports Drinks and Energy Drinks for Children and Adolescents: 
Are they Appropriate? 127 Pediatrics 1183 (2011). 
 70  Id. 
 71  Pediatrics at 1185; John P. Higgins, et. al, Energy Beverages: Content 
and Safety, Mayo Clinic Proc, Nov. 2010. 
 72  DAWN Report, supra note 53; Committee on Nutrition and the Council 
on Sports Medicine and Fitness, supra note 63, at 1182; Monster Energy 
Drinks, www.monsterenergy.com/us/en/products/. 
 73  The claim is essentially the same in the complaint’s negligence charge, 
but since negligence contains a culpability requirement where strict liability 
does not, the plaintiff additionally alleges that Monster knew or should have 
known of its product’s unreasonably dangerous or defective conditions. 
 74  Again, the negligent failure to warn claim differs from strict liability on-
ly in that it requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that Monster knew or should 
have known that its products were likely to be dangerous when used in a fore-
seeable manner and that therefore, Monster had an affirmative duty to warn of 
the dangers associated with consumption. 
 75  Petitioner Complaint at 10-11, Crossland v. Monster, 2012 WL 5007518 
(Cal. Super.) (No. RIC1215551). 
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County Superior Court in California.76 At the time of this writing, 
both cases appear to be in the early phases of discovery and 
whether the parties anticipate going to trial over the matter re-
mains unclear.77 However, these two cases represent just the be-
ginning for plaintiffs seeking to hold energy drink companies lia-
ble for damages via product liability litigation. An American 
court has yet to resolve any product liability dispute against ener-
gy drink manufacturers, so courts currently facing the question 
are thus given the unique opportunity to set the stage for the fu-
ture of energy drink safety and accountability.78 
IV.  PRODUCT LIABILITY THEORIES AND APPLICATION 
TO ENERGY DRINK LITIGATION 
A plaintiff’s most consequential decision is whether to 
bring a claim under negligence or strict liability. A brief explana-
tion of the distinction must occur to show the significant differ-
ence between the two theories. As a preliminary matter, a majori-
ty of states will allow a case to proceed on theories of both strict 
liability and negligence in the alternative.79 On the other hand, a 
minority of courts have abolished the distinction between strict 
liability and negligence entirely.80 Thus, these minority states 
have rendered the question of a claim via negligence or strict lia-
bility a moot point. One can generally characterize the distinction 
between the two theories based on the focus of the allegations.81 It 
is worth noting that the condition of the product is an element of 
                                                          
 76  Morris v. Monster, 2013 WL 3197674 (Cal. Super.) (No. RG13685028) 
(filed Jun. 25, 2013); Crossland v. Monster, 2012 WL 5007518 (Cal. Super.) (No. 
RIC1215551) (filed Oct. 17, 2012). 
 77  Morris, 2013 WL 3197674; Crossland, 2012 WL 5007518. 
 78  One American court has resolved a product liability case in favor of an 
energy drink manufacturer, but the product in question contained alcohol. 
Cook v. MillerCoors, LLC, 872 F. Supp. 2d 1346 (M.D. Fla. 2012), appeal dis-
missed (Nov. 30, 2012). Energy drinks mixed with alcohol are a markedly dis-
tinct product from non-alcoholic energy drinks and consequently there are 
numerous product liability doctrines—the “inherently dangerous product” doc-
trine, for example— at play in alcoholic products that are not similarly present 
in non-alcoholic energy drink litigation. 
 79  63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 208. 
 80  Id.; See e.g. Tirrell v. Navistar Int’l, Inc., 591 A.2d 643 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1991); Washington Water Power Co. v. Graybar Elec. Co., 774 P.2d 
1199 (Wash. 1989), opinion amended on other grounds, 779 P.2d 697 (Wash. 
1989). 
 81  63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 208. 
Kogan2.docx (Do Not Delete)  3/16/2014  1:39 PM 
2014 Litigation Against Energy Drink Manufacturers 329 
both a claim of negligence and strict liability.82 That is, in both 
cases, the plaintiff must show that the product was defective 
when it left the defendant’s control and that it reached the con-
sumer in an unreasonably dangerous condition.83 Courts also re-
quire proof of causation and injury just like any other tort 
claim.84 However, product liability law additionally focuses on 
the conduct of the defendant in negligence cases, as well as the 
condition of the product.85 The plaintiff in a negligence case must 
prove that the defendant had a duty to act reasonably and that 
the defendant breached that duty by acting outside the scope of 
the requisite standard of care.86 Since a negligence claim contains 
a culpability element, the plaintiff would generally have an easier 
time proceeding under a strict liability theory because it requires 
no investigation into the reasonableness of the defendant’s con-
duct. 
The reasonableness requirement can pose a substantial 
problem for plaintiffs pursuing a claim in a relatively new area of 
product liability law. Reasonableness requires a plaintiff to prove 
the manufacturers owed a duty of care to consumers and, ipso 
facto, requires a plaintiff to point out exactly what that duty is in 
order to determine whether or not the defendant has breached it. 
Industry standards set the most probative guideline for the duties 
a manufacturer owes to its consumers.87 However, since energy 
drink manufacturers often vary greatly with regards to what its 
label warns of and what ingredients are used in its products, 
pointing to a discrete standard that one manufacturer must abide 
by would be especially difficult. 
Furthermore, plaintiffs may face an uphill battle attempt-
ing to prove that the defendant manufacturers owed a duty to the 
consumer in the first place. The algebraic formula crafted by 
Judge Learned Hand in U.S. v. Carroll Towing serves as a refer-
ence point for whether a legal duty even exists to the plaintiff.88 
                                                          
 82  Id.; Calles v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 864 N.E.2d 249 (Ill. 2007). 
 83  63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 530. 
 84  Id. 
 85  63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 208; Boles v. Sun Ergoline, Inc., 
223 P.3d 724 (Colo. 2010) (explaining that in strict liability, the focus is not on 
either the manufacturer’s or injured person’s conduct); Haglund v. Philip 
Morris, Inc., 847 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 2006). 
 86  63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 208; Hollinger v. Shoppers Para-
dise of New Jersey, Inc., 340 A.2d 687 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975), aff’d, 
361 A.2d 578 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976). 
 87  Id. 
 88  U.S. v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947); Of course, the 
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In short, the Hand formula posits that the defendant owes a duty 
only where the defendant’s burden of taking precautions is less 
than the product of the probability of a plaintiff’s injury and the 
gravity of such injury.89 All three factors—burden of precautions, 
probability of injury, and gravity of injury—are inherently diffi-
cult to identify in a new area of the law. The science and other re-
search remains in early phases, and the sample size of cases is rel-
atively small, tending to produce wildly varying results with 
regards to the probability and gravity inquiries. 
What specific defect the plaintiff alleges presents another 
large decision that plaintiffs may face in this new area of law. 
Product liability law recognizes a number of theories to recovery 
and, while none are mutually exclusive and generally any number 
of them may be alleged,90 it can save the plaintiff more time and 
resources in the pleading process and discovery period by specifi-
cally pleading the allegations. Defective design, defective manu-
facture and failure to warn represent the most common theories 
of liability in product liability litigation.91 
A “manufacturing defect” exists when a product deviates, 
in its construction or quality, from the specifications or planned 
output in a manner that renders it unreasonably dangerous.92 
Secondly, a design defect exists when a product is built in accord-
ance with its intended specifications, but the design itself is inher-
ently defective or poses unreasonable dangers to consumers.93 
Thus, in a defective manufacturing claim, the focus of the charge 
is not on the manufacturer’s specifications or design plans, but 
rather what went wrong during the product’s manufacturing 
process. In contrast, in a defective design claim, the plaintiff fo-
cuses on the product’s inherent design rather than in the specific 
manufacturing of a product. The manufacturer’s documentable 
decisions and deliberate designs are generally evidence of defec-
tive design.94 These first two avenues of product liability do not 
fit well into the energy drink litigation area for many reasons. 
                                                                                                                                       
question of duty is a question of fact usually reserved for the jury and, alt-
hough this formula is rarely given as an express jury instruction, most com-
mentators view it as an algebraic expression of common-sense thinking about 
the question of duty. 
 89  Id. 
 90  63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 5; Sherk v. Daisy-Heddon, 427 
A.2d 657 (Pa. 1981). 
 91  63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 535. 
 92  Id. 
 93  63A AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 869. 
 94  Id. 
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Practitioners should note that distinctions between negligence 
and strict liability are based on jurisdiction. Some courts main-
tain the traditional distinction between negligence and strict lia-
bility—knowledge of the condition of the product and the risks 
involved in that condition will be imputed to the manufacturer in 
design defect cases based on strict liability—whereas in cases 
based on negligence, these elements must be proven.95 Other 
courts have found the distinction between negligence and strict 
liability regarding design and manufacturing defects effectively 
moot since under both theories, the plaintiff must prove that the 
manufacturer defectively designed the product, thereby exposing 
the user to an unreasonable risk of harm.96  
In any event, a plaintiff pursuing these claims must prove 
that the defendant manufacturer breached some sort of duty of 
care either in manufacturing the product or in its design. Again, 
proving such a breach poses a problem for plaintiffs in the energy 
drink field because of the newness of the product, and manufac-
turing and production processes vary so widely between different 
manufacturers. As a result, the plaintiff may have difficulty find-
ing uniform, or even merely generally-accepted-industry stand-
ards of care. If the plaintiff will have difficulty specifying exactly 
what standard the manufacturer has to abide by, he or she will no 
doubt have an even more difficult time proving that they 
breached it. 
Finally, courts have held that the duty to warn in a strict 
liability case relies upon the notion that, absent a warning, a 
product is defective in that it is not reasonably fit, suitable, or 
safe for its intended purpose.97 In failure-to-warn cases, courts 
have held that, unless the danger is obvious or known, a manu-
facturer has a strict duty to warn when its product is inherently 
                                                          
 95  63A AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 873; Oregon, Washington and 
South Carolina are examples of jurisdictions that maintain the distinction. See 
e.g.  Roach v. Kononen, 525 P.2d 125 (Or. 1974); Haugen v. Minnesota Mining 
& Mfg. Co., 550 P.2d 71 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976); Little v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 243 F. Supp. 2d 480 (D.S.C. 2001) (applying South Carolina 
law). 
 96  63A AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 1019; Maryland, Kentucky, 
Maine and New York are some examples of jurisdictions that have effectively 
abandoned the distinction. See e.g. Holman v. Mark Industries, Inc., 610 F. 
Supp. 1195 (D. Md. 1985); Jones v. Hutchinson Mfg., Inc., 502 S.W.2d 66 (Ky. 
1973); Stanley v. Schiavi Mobile Homes, Inc., 462 A.2d 1144 (Me. 1983); Voss 
v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204 (N.Y. 1983). 
 97  63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 1019. 
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dangerous or has dangerous propensities.98 Thus, most of the liti-
gation in this area stems from the question whether a danger is 
obvious or known and whether the product is inherently danger-
ous or has dangerous propensities. Resolution of both of these 
questions can occur in the plaintiff’s favor in a claim against en-
ergy drink manufacturers. The research is becoming increasingly 
clear to members of the scientific community—particularly cardi-
ologists and pediatricians—that energy drinks contain a poten-
tially dangerous amount of caffeine, especially considering that 
teenagers constitute a large majority of the energy drink market.99 
A growing number of researchers and physicians have concluded 
that heavy energy drink consumption, especially by teenagers 
who have lower levels of caffeine tolerance, can lead to liver 
damage, kidney failure, respiratory disorders, tachycardia, cardi-
ac arrests, and even death.100 These symptoms represent just 
some of the ways a plaintiff can show energy drinks have inher-
ently dangerous properties. 101 
A defendant manufacturer can quite possibly defend 
against these charges with the defense that consumers know of 
these dangers and as such, they do not have a duty to warn 
against every possible danger of the product including those 
which are obvious or well-known to consumers. However, one 
cannot understate the significance of who exactly these energy 
drinks are intended to reach. As mentioned previously, teenagers 
and young adults represent energy drink companies’ core de-
mographics. In other words, their product is geared specifically 
towards a group who cannot be held to the same standard as 
adults in terms of appreciation of the product’s danger. Courts 
should not allow energy drink companies’ to argue that since 
many adults know of the dangers of excessive caffeine use, they 
do not have to warn consumers about it because adults are not 
the primary consumers. 
This Note’s purpose is not to explore what type of warn-
ing might be necessary here, how visible it must be or what must 
even be included in it. Before companies and courts can answer 
                                                          
 98  Id. 
 99   Seifert, et. al., Health Effects of Energy Drinks on Children, Adoles-
cents, and Young Adults, PEDIATRICS (March, 2011), 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3065144/. 
 100  Id.; It is especially these last two side effects—cardiac arrest and 
death—which have given way to the bulk of energy drink litigation in the 
United States. 
 101  63A AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 1019. 
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any of those questions, the courts must first acknowledge that 
some duty to warn should indeed exist for energy drink compa-
nies. Only once the judiciary acknowledges that global fact—by 
appreciating the increasing gravity of research on caffeine, ado-
lescent caffeine intake and Big Energy Drink’s marketing strate-
gies—can courts begin to answer the more specific concerns 
about warnings on energy drinks. 
Still, perhaps the biggest issue plaintiffs may run into in 
this area exists in proving injury causation, not whether their 
claim lies in strict liability or in negligence. The defendant’s most 
potentially useful defense could be that the connection between 
the injury and the energy drink may simply be too attenuated, too 
remote, or even too unknown to impose liability. More research 
and more literature on the adverse effects of energy drinks is 
simply the most effective way to guard against this defense. Ideal-
ly, an energy drink trial would be staged as a battle of the experts, 
each making their respective case for the real side effects of ener-
gy drinks. Judicial recognition that energy drinks are inherently 
dangerous products which can cause serious adverse health ef-
fects to its users would be the ultimate goal.  The only way that 
the judiciary can effectively reach that conclusion is by litigation 
that advances far enough to allow plaintiffs and defendants to 
make their respective cases.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
 The current FDA regulatory scheme covering energy drinks 
has proven ineffective and self-defeating. Although the issue of 
the adverse side effects of energy drinks has gained steam in re-
cent months, how Congress will respond is not yet clear. While 
Congress, and potentially state legislatures, debate what, if any-
thing, should be done, it is increasingly becoming a concern of the 
courts through product liability litigation against energy drink 
manufacturers. Plaintiffs have used a variety of product liability 
theories in their initial complaints, but which theory will gain 
most favor with the courts is unclear. What should be clear, how-
ever, is that energy drinks contain dangerous caffeine levels, es-
pecially considering the product’s core target demographic. If 
Congress and the FDA are not willing to hold manufacturers ac-
countable, injured plaintiffs themselves must be willing to shoul-
der that burden. 
